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Abstract 
 In the ongoing War on Terror, the Obama Administration has relied heavily on a 
new form of military technology: the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, more popularly known 
as the drone. While the program has remained largely a covert operation, gradually more 
information about its effects, especially concerning civilian casualties, has begun to come 
to light. As a result of allegations over their allegedly indiscriminate use in Yemen and 
Pakistan, countries the U.S. is not at war with, a few questions arise. When do drones 
stop becoming a military precision tool for taking out Al-Qaeda senior command and 
move into a field of unchecked and rapidly proliferating military assassinations of 
terrorists and civilians alike? Have they crossed that line, and if so, are the actions of the 
United States legal under international law? In examining these key thoughts, the 
effectiveness and ultimately, alternatives to the Drone Doctrine must also be judged.  
 This report finds that the drone program has become counterproductive and 
should be stopped. The indiscriminate killings of civilians are in violation of International 
Human Rights Laws and have caused an environment where to continue drone strikes 
will only result in a permanently damaged relationship with the people of Yemen and 
Pakistan. The only way to carry out a successful drone program is to have it in the open, 
overseen by the international community. Even when that happens, drones are not a 
complete counterterrorism strategy. Other methods for building infrastructure and state 
empowerment must be used in conjunction with drones to stop terrorism and violence at 
their roots.  
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Preface 
 
“We should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against 
terrorism and protection of human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long term, 
we shall find that human rights, along with democracy and social justice, are one of the 
best prophylactics against terrorism.” 
        -Kofi Annan1 
 
“As part of our fact-finding mission in the investigation of this attack, we sought to 
obtain testimony directly from the eyewitnesses themselves. With the help of the victims' 
families, we managed to meet the wounded and record their testimony. Burns, swelling, 
and pyoderma, especially on their faces and limbs, were so severe that it was difficult to 
recognize the missile shrapnel that remained embedded in their bodies.”  
-HOOD2 
 
“The use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus on the use of force, 
force alone cannot make us safe” 
        -Barack Obama3 
 
The new face of war is chillingly faceless. In operations across remote areas of 
Pakistan and Yemen, Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UACV) emanate a loud noise, 
a constant reminder that death is near and can be instantaneous. In these areas steeped 
with danger and terrorist influence, even an operation as well planned as the one that 
killed Osama Bin Laden can prove disastrous. The risk of putting boots on the ground 
seems too great to the United States, unwilling to slide back into another Iraq or 
Afghanistan. Instead, the drone has become the weapon of choice, the centerpiece of the 
Obama counterterrorism policy. They are a precision weapon, a mechanized killing 
system, and an intelligence breakthrough. From behind one, they are a godsend. From 
beneath one, they are an angel of death. Drones are the future of warfare, a future that 
still has the potential to be either miraculous or terrifying.  
                                                        
1 Mary Robinson, “Human Rights Are as Important as Ever,” International Herald Tribune. Jun. 21, 2002.  
2 “This is the Year of Drones and Terror Security Forces,” HOOD. May 28, 2013. 
3 “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” Whitehouse.gov. May 23, 2013. 
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Introduction 
  This study was undertaken on two different levels: through academic research in 
explanations of International Humanitarian Law, transnationality, and counterterrorism 
policy as well as through personal interviews with experts in the field. The two different 
methods worked complimentarily, with prior research giving breadth to intelligent 
questions for interviews, which lead to discussions much more nuanced and broader-
reaching than most written reports. In gaining a broader and more well rounded view 
through interviews, more research could be done on new, specific aspects that had been 
brought up.  
 Much of the literature referenced in this report was produced by humanitarian 
non-governmental organizations including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, 
Al Karama, and the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies on the affects of targeted killing 
in Pakistan and Yemen. It is interesting to note that most of these repots came out within 
a week of each other at the end of October, 2013, which was timed rather conveniently 
for use in this project. The majority of the data used for numbers of attacks and casualties 
were taken from these reports, as they provide more information than the statistics 
officially released by the U.S. government. Other literature used were reports published 
in international law journals on the legality of targeted killing, and many were written by, 
contributed to, or recommended to me by the experts I interviewed. The most heavily 
used in this report was a report written by Nils Melzer to the E.U. Parliament on drones 
and targeted killing. Also heavily referenced is a case study published in The Atlantic by 
Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down, explaining the benefits and problems with 
drones.  
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 Using these first sources, I formulated questions for interviews that allowed for 
in-depth answers that could be further researched. I explained to my interviewees my 
personal opinion that drones are an effective tool of warfare that are here to stay, but the 
way in which they are currently being used is unsustainable. From there, I asked about 
legal frameworks they thought would apply, the threat of proliferation, the idea that 
drones are now counterproductive, alternatives to military action, mechanisms for 
accountability, and what can be done internationally to change the current policy of the 
U.S. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the situations in both Pakistan and Yemen to 
determine the legality of the U.S. use of drones. In doing so, it can be seen that a military 
response covers only some of the issues that are at the root of terrorism in these countries. 
It has therefore reached a point where regardless of the legality of the strikes, they have 
become counterproductive and alternatives should be employed. A combination of the 
way the U.S. has used drones in these places coupled with the current political situations 
have made drones a counterproductive policy that should be readjusted. Transparency 
from the governments of the U.S., Yemen, and Pakistan as well as with the number of 
casualties should be a priority. Following, mechanisms for accountability and 
international oversight ought to be put into place to avoid any further situations where 
drones have to be stopped because of misuse. Drones are seen in Yemen and Pakistan as 
a harbinger of destruction and death. That does not have to be their reality. By making 
adjustments, the drone can continue to be useful for fighting counterterrorism, but only 
with restraint and alongside other social policies and reforms that cut to the roots of 
terrorism instead of only their most visible results.  
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Changing International Reality 
One of the main reasons behind the debate over the use of drones is the changing 
nature of warfare itself. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world experienced a 
meltdown of the Cold War reality, where international relations would happen in terms of 
unified and largely predictable blocks.4 The current state of global affairs is much 
different from the world that the pre-existing laws of warfare were written in. No longer 
do conflicts simply happen internally or between state actors, in fact, most wars and 
especially those where drones are heavily featured, are between states and non-state actor 
groups.  
One issue that has given rise to this is the proliferation of failed and failing states 
where governments are not strong enough to retain complete control over their territories. 
In these situations, political vacuums take over and allow for the rise of non-state actors 
to gain control often through violent means. When these situations arise, as they have in 
the cases of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and even Lebanon to an extent, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to monitor and control the movement of people, money, 
and goods, as well as to enforce and regulate overlapping legal frameworks and 
jurisdictions that result from non-state actors.5  
This presents a challenge to international jurisdiction because though the basic 
laws of war should imply in theory, non-state actors were not party to agreements and 
therefore feel no obligation to follow them.6 The lack of accountability and structure of 
these groups also makes it difficult to target, punish, and negotiate with them when 
                                                        
4 Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, interview by author, November 7, 2013. 
5 Andrea J. Dew, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, and 
Policy Options” Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 2007. 
6 David Atwood, interview by author, October 31, 2013. 
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necessary.7 It is due to this unconventionality that these new and also unconventional 
methods for engaging non-state actors have arisen. The United States’ War on Terror is 
not against an organized and unified movement. Instead, the U.S. faces an enemy that 
they increasingly do not understand in an area out of control of traditional government. 
None of this serves as a justification for the use of drones, but instead provides a context 
for why the international laws of war may have to be reassessed in light of new enemies 
and new weapons. In this view, laws must either constantly adapt to new technology8, or 
interpretations must be bold, rapid, and correct in order to keep technology from running 
free from jurisdiction. 
History of Drones 
The first thing to establish is that the drones themselves are not unconventional. 
Since the First and Second World Wars, the United States and the United Kingdom have 
been using unmanned aircraft to deploy bombs on enemies. The difference now is the 
range and accuracy with which these weapons operate.9 As opposed to the indiscriminate 
bombings of B-24’s that characterized the Second World War in the bombings of 
Coventry and Dresden, the current drones have the ability of surveillance to aid their 
attacks.10 Although the methods for surveillance have also greatly improved, using 
cameras on planes has been in use since the Vietnam War.11 So then what is it that is so 
unsettling about the newest incarnations of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles? 
                                                        
7 Andrea J. Dew, Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, “Empowered Groups, Tested Laws, and 
Policy Options” Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University, 2007. 
8 Marc Finaud, Interview with Author, November 5, 2013. 
9 Michel Veuthey, in Interview with Author, October 31, 2013. 
10 Mark Bowden, “How the Predator Drone Changed the Character of War,” Smithsonian Magazine, 
November 2013.  
11 Ibid. 
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The U.S. currently uses two types of unmanned aircraft, the Predator and the 
Reaper. The Predator was first used in 2000 in missions aimed at locating Osama Bin 
Laden following the attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa in 1997.12 The Predator drone 
was developed for surveillance, with a 60-mile panorama13 available from the plane that 
can stay airborne for anywhere from 19-40 hours without refueling.14 After September 
11, the demand for a military reaction prompted Hellfire missiles to be attached to the 
Predator. This became the Predator’s larger incarnation: the Predator B, known as the 
Reaper, which can carry twice as many missiles as its predecessor as well as two laser-
guided bombs.15 Whereas the Predator is equipped largely for surveillance, there is no 
mistaking the purpose of the Reaper. The Reaper has advanced infrared sensors, radars, 
and cameras for detection all for the larger purpose of attack. Reapers have been active in 
Afghanistan since 2007.16 Because of its increased weight, the Reaper has less airtime 
than the Predator, though its increased speed still allows for more long-range missions.17 
The biggest innovation in both the Predator and the Reaper from their 20th century 
incarnations is their global communications systems, which allowed for the UAV’s to be 
piloted from anywhere in the world.18 The data link in drones allows for cheap, constant, 
real-time surveillance on suspected targets. The American drones’ satellite links and data 
                                                        
12 Mark Bowden, “How the Predator Drone Changed the Character of War,” Smithsonian Magazine, 
November 2013. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Thomas Michael McDonnell, “Sow what you reap? Using predator and reaper drones to carry out 
assasinations or targeted killings of suspected Islamic terrorists,” George Washington International Law 
Review 44, no. 2 (2012). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013. 
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processors are what provide their technological strength,19 making it difficult for any 
other country to currently develop a rival system.20  
Technological shortcomings within the two main drone models are still to be 
expected in this early phase of their widespread use. Because of their absolute reliance on 
communication with the ground, if a worm is inserted, a drone can be corrupted.21 If this 
happens, and the encryption of a drone is broken, it can be taken over by an enemy.22 
There has been one report of a drone malfunctioning over Afghanistan in 2009, sending 
the $13 million aircraft into neighboring Tajikistan.23 It is unclear the reason for its 
malfunction. There have already been reports of crashed drones and other aircraft 
recovered and reassembled by states like Iran as early as 2011.24 The key component 
though, the intelligence capabilities, are not available in Iran, rendering the recovered 
aircraft little more than an overgrown remote-controlled Christmas toy.25 This may not be 
cause for immediate concern, but should give pause as to the infallibility of technology. 
Even with these potential breakdowns, the actual Predator and Reaper are not to 
fear compared with the aircraft that are in line to follow. The next generation of 
unmanned weapons will be autonomous, with multiple projects in the works to posses the 
ability to carry out attacks without human command. This is referred to as man-out-of-
the-loop technology and carries with it a much weightier implication of violation of 
                                                        
19 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013. 
20 Michel Veuthey, in Interview with Author, October 31, 2013. 
21 Oceane Zubeldia, Interview with author, October 31, 2013. 
22 Ibid. 
23
 C. J. Chivers, Carlotta Gall, and Andrew W. Lehren, “View Is Bleaker Than Official Portrayal of War in 
Afghanistan,” The New York Times. (New York, New York). Jul. 25, 2010.   
24
 Greg Miller, “Drone belonged to CIA, officials say,” Washington Post. (Washington D.C.) Dec. 6, 2011. 
25 Thom Shanker, “Simple, Low-Cost Surveillance Drones Provide Advantage for U.S. Military” The New 
York Times. Jan. 24, 2013. 
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existing international laws of war.26 Although the full development of such weapons may 
still be a ways off until they are acceptably functional,27 a strong reaction to the current 
use of unmanned drones can lend itself to better precedents and mechanisms for control 
for weapons to come. To explore just what those mechanisms are or should be, it is 
necessary to look at the drone policy in place for the country currently leading by 
example--the United States.  
Obama’s Drone Doctrine 
The official decision of the United States to undertake drones as a methodology 
for targeted killing begun under George W. Bush with the attack in Yemen in 2002. 
During both of his terms, President Bush authorized no more than 50 drone strikes.28 In 
the past 4 years, President Barack Obama has signed off on over 400.29 In 2008, there 
were 35 attacks, in 2009, 53, in 2010, 117 all in Pakistan alone.30 In that time, The New 
America Foundation reported that 3,300 jihadist operatives were killed in Pakistan, 
including over 50 senior officers.31 Important to note is that these numbers are widely 
disputed, but best represent the argument for the use of drones.   
The rise and relative military success of drones represents the shifting global 
dimension as well as the rapid rise of technology.32 Drones give the authority of the 
President and a select few including John Brennan, former adviser on Counterterrorism 
                                                        
26 Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,” 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May 
2013.  
27 Ibid. 
28 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, “Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2013,” The 
Long War Journal. Accessed Nov. 19, 2013. http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php. 
31 Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work,” Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug2013, Vol. 92 Issue 4. 
32 Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, interview by author, November 7, 2013. 
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and current head of the CIA, the power to curate a list of suspected terrorist operatives to 
hunt down and kill individually.33 The list consists of three levels: high value targets, 
imminent threats, and signature strikes.34 High value targets are defined as high-level Al-
Qaeda operatives. Imminent threats include examples like a truck of bombs moving 
towards the Afghan border.35 Signature strikes are the most controversial, defined as 
attacks on suspicious activities in enemy territory.36 In this practice, all male casualties 
deemed to be militant-aged are counted as combatant casualties for official numbers.37  
The meetings for determining the “kill list” are often highly contentious and 
include representatives from the Pentagon, CIA, State Department, National 
Counterterrorism Center, and occasionally the Justice Department.38 The criterion for 
determining who was on the list is threefold.39 First, the legality needs to be affirmed by 
assuring that the target is partaking in terrorist activities.40 Second, the person must be 
deemed to be carrying out an action that constitutes an imminent threat to the United 
States.41 Third, it must be deemed that capture is not possible and there is near certainty 
                                                        
33 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” The New 
York Times, (New York, New York), May 29, 2012.  
34 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,” 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May 
2013. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations 
Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilites,” whitehouse.gov, May 23, 2013. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-
use-force-counterterrorism. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
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of no civilian casualties.42 Who makes the final decision whether or not someone can be 
targeted is unclear. 
The precedent for this practice under the Obama administration was put into place 
directly after the Sept. 11 attacks, with the Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF). 
AUMF was approved on Sept. 14, 2001 and allows all “necessary and appropriate force” 
against those operatives who planned the attack as well as those helping to harbor them.43 
Whether or not AUMF still applies is a legal question, and its legitimacy is one that even 
the President himself doubts,44 but certainly the power the act granted to the president 
himself was unprecedented. The direct involvement of the President of a major world 
power to handpick individuals to kill, on paper, sounds like a prudent and controlled 
alternative to war. Controversy comes in with the secrecy with which this process is 
taking place and the lack of oversight the U.S. government has over it as well as the 
amount of information released publicly.45 That and, of course, whether or not the 
president should have this authority in the first place.  
The Drone Doctrine is not the same across the board for all countries it currently 
operates in the jurisdiction of. Examples of drone use in Libya and Afghanistan are much 
different than those carried out in Yemen and Pakistan, where it is unclear whether or not 
they have legal permission to operate. Besides that, because of the secrecy with which 
drones are used in Yemen and Pakistan, it is difficult to assess the extent and details that 
differentiate the two. What is known is that the use in Pakistan is almost all under the 
                                                        
42 Ibid. 
43 “107th Congress Public Law 40” Sept. 18, 2001. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ40/html/PLAW-107publ40.htm 
44 “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,” Whitehouse.gov. May 23, 2013. 
45 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013.  
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control of the CIA.46 In Yemen, however, strikes are conducted by the CIA as well as the 
U.S. Navy.47 There is also cooperation with Saudi Arabia for the training of troops, 
though again, the extent of their involvement with drones is unsure.48 This is important, 
because even with the limited information available, some judgments can be made as far 
as the status of combatants, state of conflict, and ultimately, the actual legality of U.S. 
drone strikes in these two countries. It is doubly important to note the information that is 
necessary to make complete judgments on how drone programs should look going into 
the future.  
Existing Legal Frameworks 
To understand how this shift in global politics affects the regulation of drones, it 
is important to understand the legal frameworks that do already exist. The first body of 
law to be considered is International Humanitarian Law, or the laws of war that are 
focused on protecting civilians in conflict zones.49 To a certain extent, civilian death is 
unavoidable in times of conflict. In order to minimize the harm done, IHL has worked to 
established guidelines of when and how civilian casualties are acceptable. Attacks are 
illegal which target civilians, do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, or 
cause civilian loss that is excessive compared to the anticipated military gain.50 
The question then becomes, how do transnational terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda fit into this description? It is obvious that, by definition, terrorist organizations are 
in direct violation of these rules and therefore should have to endure international 
                                                        
46 “License to Kill: Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law,” Al Karama. 
October 17, 2013.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: Similarities and Differences,” 
International Committee of the Red Cross. Accessed Nov. 18, 2013. 
50 “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” Human Rights Watch. October 2013. 
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retribution. Because of the current lack of organization in the current incarnations of Al-
Qaeda and its affiliates, it is nearly impossible to capture one figurehead and bring them 
to justice, or have the organization make monetary reparations as has been the traditional 
route of dealing with war crimes. The rise of such groups, as discussed earlier, happened 
much after the original rules and conventions of IHL were written. That does not 
necessarily mean the rules are outdated, instead, the vague language allows for more 
interpretation over time in action. What is important now is how new thinking is applied 
in the actions taken internationally to the challenges presented by both Al-Qaeda and the 
U.S.’s continued use of drones against them. 
Under the Geneva Conventions, Al-Qaeda operates as a sort of Fourth Generation 
Warfare. This is a new development in the latter part of the twentieth century that is 
characterized by a much weaker opponent utilizing tactics that are in clear violation of 
IHL against much stronger opponents.51 This creates a vastly asymmetrical style of 
warfare, with the advent of technology tilting this balance even more. However, it is 
important to note that these groups utilizing Fourth Generation Warfare can defeat their 
stronger opponents because of their violations of IHL, specific to low-cost, high-impact 
attacks against civilians.52 Although there are extraordinary manners used by Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban in their terror attacks, there is no precedent yet for an extraordinary 
response. Instead, IHL should remain in place and reciprocating stronger states like the 
U.S. should better harness their technological advances for military victory. Here, a 
correct usage of drones can play an essential part in military strategy.  
                                                        
51 Roger Barnett, “Asymmetric warfare: Today’s Challenges to US Military Power,” 2002 
52 Ibid. 
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A larger with issue with IHL and drones is determining whether or not the people 
who are living in areas where they are used in the Middle East are living in conflict 
zones. If the level of violence caused by Al-Qaeda and their affiliates constitutes a 
conflict zone, then the group can be classified as combatants who can be targeted, making 
approved U.S. targeted attacks against them are perfectly legal.53 However, if terrorists in 
Yemen and Pakistan are not combatants in an armed conflict, then to target and kill them 
extra judicially would be a war crime worthy of international examination in a criminal 
court.54   
It is obvious that terrorists cause violence, but the international legal definition of 
combatants is more expansive than sporadic acts of terror. Certainly in Afghanistan, a 
state in which the U.S. has officially declared a war against Al-Qaeda operatives, 
civilians there are living in an armed conflict and are therefore protected by International 
Humanitarian Law.55 However, the incidents of terrorism in Pakistan, Yemen, and even 
Somalia all vary in intensity and frequency. The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia deemed an armed conflict to exist between a state and an organized 
group featuring protracted violence.56 However, the organization of Al-Qaeda has been 
largely dismantled, breaking down its structure and centralized organization. 
Autonomous groups have sprung up, identifying themselves as being part of Al-Qaeda, 
                                                        
53 Alexandre Vautravers, Interview with Author, October 30, 2013. 
54 Akbar Nasir Khan, “Legality of Targeted Killings by Drone Attacks in Pakistan,” Pakistan Institute for 
Peace Studies. February 2011.  
55 Susan Breau, Marie Aronsson, and Rachel Joyce, “Discussion Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International 
Law, and the Recording for Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict,” Oxford Research Group. June 2011.  
56 Helen Duffy, “The ‘War on Terror’ and the Framework of International Law,” (2005). 
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which does not exist as a hierarchical organization with centralized control over all of 
these groups anymore.57  
The Taliban is a different example. The Northwestern territories of Waziristan in 
Pakistan can be recognized as a non-international conflict zone.58 This is the area largely 
under the control of the Taliban and is experiencing frequent and contracted violence.59 
Yemen and the rest of Pakistan, though violent and unstable areas, do not seem yet to 
meet this constitution. The ongoing security concerns in Yemen can be traced to four 
separate local entities each fighting for a different cause, in a different region, though 
often economically motivated.60 This would point away from the definition of an 
organized structure committing contracted violence. However, these conclusions are far 
from final, and fostering international discussion over more what more specifically 
constitutes a conflict zone is needed. If Yemen and Pakistan are not conflict zones, then 
the only way to enforce counterterrorism is through the governments in place there, the 
ramifications of which are discussed later.  
Even in the view that Yemen and the entirety of Pakistan are areas of conflict, and 
therefore covered by IHL, one issue that immediately arises with the use of drones is the 
process by which combatants have been identified from civilians. Civilians are defined in 
a negative sense as not being combatants. Combatants are defined as members of armed 
groups taking a direct part in hostilities.61 It is legal to target those deemed to be 
                                                        
57 “License to Kill: Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law,” Al Karama. 
October 17, 2013. 
58 Susan Breau, Marie Aronsson, and Rachel Joyce, “Discussion Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International 
Law, and the Recording for Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict,” Oxford Research Group. June 2011. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Alexandra Lewis, “Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines 
of Conflict and Terrorism,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. May 14, 2013. 
61 “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” Human Rights Watch. October 2013. 
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combatants or other military personnel during a time of conflict, as long as the rules of 
proportionality apply.62 Civilians, on the other hand, are never allowed to be targeted in 
times of peace or war. In attacks that may involve the death of civilians to bring about 
combatant deaths or other strategic measures, the rules of proportionality and precaution 
work to strike a balance between military necessity and humanity.63 This provision 
allows for much situational interpretation. 
In the case of drone policy, this interpretation is much looser than it ought to be. 
The practice for determining the identities of targets as either combatants or civilians is 
especially legally dubious in the use of signature strikes.64 This has an interesting root in 
traditional warfare. Before the advent of targeted killing, it was common practice to open 
fire on those in Nazi uniforms in World War II and the Vietcong in Vietnam.65 Al-Qaeda 
is not physically distinguishable from civilians. Though signature strikes have killed 
leaders unexpectedly who just happened to be there, they are highly contentious under 
IHL. Opening fire on a group of people who look like terrorists--or under the U.S. 
standards, a military aged man—is most certainly in violation with the principle of 
distinction.  
 Another pertinent caveat is that of the Hague Regulations of 1907, which made 
targeting a combatant who had laid down their weapon or surrendered a war crime.66 Of 
course, there is no chance of surrender with drones, as death happens in seconds from 
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above.67 The opportunity for surrender, unlike due process, is still a right that is afforded 
to combatants,68 so regardless of how terrorist groups in Pakistan and Yemen are 
classified, they ought to have the opportunity to surrender to prevent what could be called 
indiscriminate killings. This does not mean that given the opportunity, every combatant 
would surrender. It doesn’t even mean any of them have to. However, killing suspected 
terrorists without any chance for defense, while not a blatant violation of this regulation, 
certainly does not pass it with flying ethical muster.69 
In short, while the principles of IHL still ought to be regarded as good guides for 
appropriate behavior in warfare, there is discord over whether the United States has any 
obligation to follow these and the Geneva Conventions in the situation of drones. That 
still does not jettison their actions into a realm of legal vacuum. Whether or not the 
terrorists acts in these regions constitute conflicts, in its attacks, the United States 
certainly must follow the conventions of human rights.  
This leads to the second body of law to consider, International Human Rights 
Law, which applies to the protection of human rights universally both in times in conflict 
and peace.70 IHRL regulates the proportionality of killings as well as the duty to 
minimize harm.71 The use of force is to be used as a last resort, when capture is not 
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possible and an imminent threat is posed. These laws can be deviated from only in a time 
of immediate crisis, when the life of a state is threatened.72 
Here is where the argument inevitably turns more subjective if for no other reason 
than a lack of information. John Brennan contends that there were zero collateral 
casualties in 2011.73 Of course, the practice of counting all military-aged men as 
operatives casts doubt on that claim.74 The Government of the United States officially has 
acknowledged 4,70075 deaths as a result of drones, although the location of the targets as 
well as their status as combatants is unclear. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
estimates that in Pakistan, anywhere from 2,065-3,613 combatants have been killed, as 
well as anywhere from 153-926 civilians in 348-374 strikes.76 Human Rights Watch 
released a report this year that took a look at these numbers in Yemen, where an 
estimated 80 attacks have happened since the drone program was reinstated in 2009.77 
The report considers only six of these attacks, which resulted in 82 casualties, 57 of 
whom were civilians.78 Although these six cases represent only a small portion of the 
whole, there is something clearly indiscriminate about a civilian casualty rate of 70%. 
Regardless of whether the laws of IHL apply to these indiscretions, the rules of 
IHRL certainly cover the same jurisdiction for the discrepancies in casualties.79 The two 
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legal bodies work together to cover these gaps that may occur, in this case, with the 
involvement of non-state actors and sporadic violence. This is important because it 
determines the forum for discussion as well as punitive measures that can be taken. If 
outcry by civil society for U.S. reporting of casualties becomes widespread enough, three 
things can happen. In the first situation, the actions by the U.S. in at least some of their 
targeted killings are deemed egregious and crimes against humanity. Then, monetary and 
political reparations are paid to the families of the victims, and drones move towards 
becoming a more carefully regulated weapon. In the second, and less likely scenario, the 
use of drones by the U.S. in these examples is deemed to be within their legal bounds, 
and nothing changes in the use of drones except perhaps slightly more accountability.  
It is the third route that is the most legally confounding. One major part of these 
bodies of law is the idea of consent. If it is the case that the violence only concerns the 
imminent security of Yemen and not the U.S., then the U.S. would have no legal grounds 
for any targeted killing in Yemen short of government permission.80 If a country has the 
consent of another state’s government to intervene in that state, it is legitimate.81 This is 
problematic for the issue of drones because it is officially ambiguous if the United States 
has permission from the governments of Pakistan and Yemen to operate on their 
territories in taking out terrorist operatives. The government of Pakistan has been open in 
condemning the involvement of Americans, especially in the widely unpopular use of 
drone strikes, which only 17% of the population supported in June of 2012.82 Contrary to 
these claims, prominent American news sources including The New York Times and The 
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Washington Post have published numerous articles stating in no unclear language that the 
governments of Pakistan and Yemen both have agreements that allow the United States 
to operate drones over their territories.83  
This is one of the reasons such ambiguity exists on the legal interpretations of the 
drone policy of the United States, because little to no official information is available to 
the public on how they are planned or carried out. The U.S. first acknowledged that it 
was even carrying out direct strikes in Yemen in 2012, 10 years after the first strike there 
and 3 years after the program had been re-vamped.84 Even then, this acknowledgment by 
the U.S. mentioned only direct action taken by the military, not the CIA who were in 
charge of the drone strikes at the time.85  
What this lack of transparency means on a larger scale is that it serves as a 
method to thwart public debate as well as to enshrine a covert government operation. 
Because NGO’s are not aware of the mechanisms in place to determine when and against 
whom targeted killings are launched, there can be no debate over their effectiveness or 
legality. This leads to discord within a civil society movement that ought to be unified in 
order to bring about the legal action they desire. Some organizations like Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch take a more conservative route and advocate only 
for better accountability before making further judgments on the drone program as a 
whole.86 On the other hand, UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns87 and Middle Eastern 
advocacy groups like Al Karama, HOOD, and The Pakistan Institute for Peace push for 
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more hardline international disapproval, arguing that not only does IHL not apply, but 
even if it did, most strikes would be illegal.88 
One side being right in this argument does not signify the incorrectness of the 
other. What is at stake is the efficiency and effectiveness of the discourse that needs to 
take place in agreeing on an acceptable usage of drones. If this second school of thought 
is correct, the lack of transparency decried by the first becomes even more problematic. 
As time moves on and the current practice of targeted killing continues largely 
unopposed between world powers, the less likely it is that those practices will change 
simply because more states will begin using the technology in the precedent that is now 
being set. And if this second school of thought is correct, and the way the majority of 
current drone strikes are being carried out is illegal. That sets an incredibly dangerous 
precedent of use for the rest of the world, all the while, keeping the military and 
executive processes behind closed doors. 
Outside of violations within IHL and IHRL, the third looming question is over the 
legality of the United State’s intervention in Pakistan and Yemen in the first place. The 
right of a country to wage war and intervene on another state’s territory, Jus Ad Bellum, 
originates from the UN Charter.89 The international justification for war lays in Article 51 
of the Charter, which authorizes forces as a means of self-defense against an imminent 
threat.90 Whether or not twelve years after the September 11th attacks, Al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates are still a direct and imminent threat to the security of the United States is 
unclear. Not since the writing of the original UN Charter has a rebel group incited a 
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quasi-global war such as the one unfolding throughout the Middle East. Since no 
precedent exists for waging such a war, the United States taking action is a way of 
forming their own unilateral legal interpretation.91 With the disposal of many of the 
world’s forefront legal experts, the United States has formulated a hardline defense of 
their war against Al-Qaeda, vehemently arguing for their need for self-defense. This does 
not make it an infallible position. Major human rights groups, including Human Rights 
Watch and Amnesty International, call into question the extent that violence in the states 
of Yemen and Pakistan that actually affects the U.S. instead of just those country’s 
autonomous governments.92 
If the original intervention of the United States does pass legal standards, perhaps 
that only suggests shortcomings not of the international laws, but of the United States’ 
most recent interpretations of them.93 One of the largest issues is the position this has put 
the United States in as acting internationally however they deem to be acceptable without 
much concern for global approval. In taking direct action, the U.S. has already put into 
play military and executive interpretations of the laws of war that may or may not be 
legal. These interpretations and specifically the decision to use targeted killings, though 
difficult to decipher their final consequences, are an example of the complexity that 
comes with working out international law in the changing face of warfare. Despite these 
legal and ethical questions that come with the policies of targeted killing, to go through a 
more traditional legal route may have proven to be more difficult challenging in 
achieving their end goals. 
                                                        
91 Mohammad-Mahmoud Mohamedou, interview by author, November 7, 2013. 
92 “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda” Human Rights Watch. October 2013. 
93 Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare,” 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, as Requested by the European Parliament. May 
2013. 
  
27 
27 
If the United States had deemed that the threats against their national security 
were not urgent enough to wage a war, their course of action would have proven to be 
convoluted to say the least. If the threat of Al-Qaeda was not deemed imminent, 
cooperation through the state governments of Pakistan and Yemen would have be 
necessary. This would have dictated a state of law enforcement cooperation with the 
home countries, not military action.94 Of course, in Pakistan, and especially Yemen, the 
governments in place have little to no law enforcement power over the terrorist groups 
that reside there, one of the main problems that allowed for the rise of terrorist 
organizations in these regions in the first place. Both country’s political systems are 
different, but it important to understand their shortcomings to see both how terrorists 
gained such influence over them and why the military response of drones, even if legally 
executed, can only cover a small portion of the issues currently facing Yemen and 
Pakistan.   
Why Drone Policy Is Incomplete 
The increase of American interest in Yemen in 2009 is no coincidence. Al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), currently identified by the U.S. as its most dangerous 
current incarnation, officially announced its existence early in that year.95 Even before 
this declaration, Yemen has existed in a protracted state of instability, with civil wars in 
1994 and 2011.96 Pakistan is a different example. The most imminent threat in Pakistan 
remains the Taliban, who have occupied much of the border region of the country since 
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2001.97 These regions occupied by terrorist organizations are ones with weak jurisdiction 
that are also physically difficult to reach and to patrol. Because of the situation, drones 
may seem a reasonable military strategy, debate over their usage aside. The infrastructure 
does not exist to send domestic troops into these areas to properly tackle the issues facing 
them.98 That has created a seemingly better alternative of reliance on drones that has left 
other options unexplored. Unlike state building, which proved to be a failure when 
attempted in Iraq, targeted military killings are a strategy the United States both 
understands and can execute with efficiency.99 It can be seen in the light of the analogy of 
the hammer and nail, where to those who hold the hammer, everything looks like a nail. 
However, despite years of deploying military force against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, 
problems continually persist with terrorism in the Middle East, meaning it may be time 
for the United States to utilize a different toolbox.  
One of the signs that the continued military action in fighting terrorism has 
become ineffective is the growing disdain for it in Pakistan and Yemen. A 2012 Pew 
survey estimates that around 74% of Pakistanis view the U.S. as the enemy.100 This 
should cast severe doubt on the methods the U.S. is currently employing in Pakistan, 
which of course calls into question its counterterrorism policy as a whole. At the same 
time, from a military perspective, it is impossible to imagine a successful policy that does 
not include taking out the key strategic terrorist leaders.101 Because this balance has been 
so misconstrued through civilian casualties and a lack of information, the public opinion 
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has turned against the United States in a way that is both immensely problematic and at 
the same time nearly impossible to fix.102 The issue stems from the United States’ own 
secrecy, but is then propagated through the local governments and even now at a national 
level by the governments, especially of Pakistan. At this point in time, in both Yemen and 
Pakistan, there is a widespread belief that the current methods used for fighting terrorism 
serve only to create more terrorists.103  
Here is one anecdotal example to illustrate this idea in action.104 Take a man 
killed in a drone strike, either civilian or combatant. In Yemen, a country where 
polygamy is legal, this leaves possibly multiple wives and young children without any 
method at all to support themselves. No state relief exists to aid them, so if a group like 
Al-Qaeda steps into that void to fulfill those needs, that have created a whole small 
network of supporters. This example does not necessarily mean the U.S. should step in 
and support the widows and children of people they have deemed to be terrorists, but it 
goes to illustrate just how void Yemen is of government influence, and how the uprooting 
of AQAP is much more difficult than simply killing off their leaders.  
To stop terrorism at its roots is a much deeper social project, but because of the 
current failure of military efforts, attention should be shifted to the underlying problems 
that targeted killings only exacerbate instead of cure. As shown in the example above, the 
reason terrorism is growing is two-pronged. The first thing to understand is why these 
terrorist organizations are still gaining support from the people, especially in Yemen.105 
There, the group is not seen as a political one, and their popular support does not come 
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from the desire for them to take over the government.106 Instead, AQAP gains interest 
because they are viewed as the only viable alternative to the Western influences. Many 
Al-Qaeda operatives were prominent people in villages and society before joining the 
group, a factor that lends itself to popular support and helps propagate the position that 
Al-Qaeda is the only option for defense against imperial powers like Saudi Arabia and 
the United States.107 For the people to who drones are an early death constantly flying 
above, there are very choices for defense besides the continued support of terrorist 
groups.  
The other reason AQAP has continued to rise in prominence despite drone attacks 
is the lack of state that allowed it to form so strongly in the first place.108 There are still 
vast problems of underdevelopment and absence of state in South Yemen, which has 
been plagued by decades of civil war.109 In Al-Qaeda, there is a chance for security for 
those who the state is unable to reach or does not have the power to. In this way, 
terrorism becomes a vicious cycle of rising from state destabilization, and then through 
recruitment and promises made on fixing failing governments, further causes a 
decentralization of the state. This cycle, made worse by the current drone policy, also 
works to thwart the U.S.’s interests in creating a democratic state. If the drone policy 
continues, popular opinion shows no signs of changing favorably for the U.S. If popular 
opinion continues against the U.S., eventually elected leaders will reflect the people’s 
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will, creating more of an issue of a valid state government selected by the people who are 
opposed to American interests.110  
Again, how is it possible to stop this cycle? Military action has reached a state of 
being counterproductive, but when weighed against the deeper issues in Yemen and 
Pakistan, other options can seem to be a futile undertaking. One suggestion is the idea of 
negotiation with AQAP, which has traditionally been seen as negative in giving 
recognition and authenticity to groups whose existence is threatening.  However, in 
negotiating, terrorist organizations may have more at stake than the U.S. Historically, 
groups like the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and even the Muslim Brotherhood have had more 
success and popular support when they were more radical and marginalized.111 By 
attempting to bring them closer to the center and taking away their status as radical, Al-
Qaeda groups will either be seen as less powerful, or if they refuse to negotiate, as more 
part of the problem than the answer.112 Another issue that plays into the radicalization of 
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban is the targeting of their leadership. Although it is a necessary 
step in destabilizing the groups, often less experienced and more radical members fill in 
these positions.113 Though this may be an unavoidable side effect, it is still important to 
note that radicalization will not be gotten rid of through targeted killing alone. 
Another point to look into is the reallocation of funds. A Reaper drone costs, on 
average, $12.5 million, on its own, not counting ammunition, pilots, intelligence, 
surveillance, and data connections.114 In a state where many towns are still lacking roads 
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and basic facilities, these numbers seem disproportionate. Instead, those resources could 
be invested into longer-term projects, including improving education, infrastructure, 
better native police training, and societal de-radicalization.115 The government of the U.S. 
is already the largest global contributor to Yemen, donating more than $1 billion since 
2007, about half of which was designated towards training.116 Saudi Arabia is another 
partner in this effort117 and much of the actual training takes place there. The military 
policies usually enrolled by Yemen and Pakistan involves questionable tactics at the best, 
including torture, indiscriminate bombings, and scorched earth policies.118 
Once again, the lack of infrastructure within Yemen makes it very difficult to 
assess the amount this money has worked to change.119 That does not designate the 
country as a black hole of investment. It does complicate even the most benevolent and 
well-meaning investment strategies. As most changes happening from this money are still 
taking root right now, it is difficult to determine just what the outcomes of the plans will 
be. In the worst possible scenario, if another civil war were to happen, which is not 
altogether unlikely, even in investing in well-meaning social projects like the training of 
the police force, the U.S. could be seen as choosing sides and therefore alienating itself 
further from the populations there.120 
With even the best and most peaceful-seeming options given the possibility to 
further unrest and destabilization, is there any hope for creating lasting security away 
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from terrorist influence in Yemen and Pakistan? Concretely, it has yet to be seen. Drones 
certainly have run their course in long-term usefulness as any further use would 
constitute and even steepen the already massive amount of domestic disapproval for the 
practice. Investments may not bring about significant enough change to keep warring 
forces at bay and provide for the gaps and basic needs of the population. However, they 
remain the best option moving forward. In empowering local groups and police forces 
with proper training and tactics, the governments of Yemen and Pakistan can remain 
preferable options to terror. If in the national mentality, the option of Al-Qaeda does not 
provide for their needs as well as the current government does, the group’s popular 
support will wane.121 If drones continually attack and reforms seem far off and 
ineffective, the issues that create terrorism will only worsen.  
Geopolitics 
The last thing to consider within the current use of drones is the relationship that 
it is creating between countries. Already, there are debates across the U.S. about the 
alleged relationship between the governments of Pakistan and Yemen in condoning U.S. 
strikes over their territories, as previously mentioned. While the legal implications of this 
were explored, it was left unopened as to why the government of Pakistan especially 
would deny so strongly its cooperation with the U.S.  It has been established that many of 
the strikes were carried out in a way that was harmful to the reputation of the U.S., and it 
is obvious why it would be against the interest of the governments of Pakistan and 
Yemen to take even partial responsibility for a program that is widely unpopular. Also, 
admitting the U.S. is responsible for strikes against terrorists under their jurisdiction has 
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poor political implications. First of all, it becomes an open admission that they are not 
powerful enough on their own to defend their states’ security interests from the 
organizations residing there, further damaging their legitimacy.122 Even beyond 
damaging their own projection of power, admitting to cooperation with the U.S. could 
make them appear as a puppet government, operating only for Western interests and 
completely undermining any claim they have of representing their own populations’ 
interests.123  
As much as the governments of Yemen and Pakistan cannot afford to be 
associated with the U.S. drone strikes as a result of how they’ve been carried out, they 
also cannot afford to have terrorist organizations run wild in their territories, and lack the 
military power alone to stop them.124 If the U.S. thinks these same groups are an 
imminent threat and is willing to carry out the battle for them, what real choice does that 
leave the governments of Yemen and Pakistan?  
Although currently the U.S. is one of the few countries in the world that has the 
capacity to utilize drone technology for targeted killings at such a long range,125 it must 
be recognized that eventually this type of technology will spread. The affect that eventual 
proliferation of drone technology will have on the relationship between states may be the 
only real impetus to bring about change.126 To create a rudimentary drone is not difficult, 
and could be done by states and non-state actors alike that the United States would prefer 
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to not possess this capability, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.127  It is already 
reported that Iran has flown unmanned drones over Israel, which were promptly shot 
down.128 
The U.S. has reportedly sold drones to both France and Germany; allies whose 
interests it is unlikely will clash with their own.129 This may actually serve in the benefit 
of the U.S., taking international pressure off of their drone program as the only one 
utilizing targeted killings. However, the culture of use in other countries that possess this 
technology is much different from the U.S., and it is unlikely that France will utilize their 
drones for anything other than surveillance before it is clear how the international 
community will react to the practice of targeted killing.130 Europe, though it utilizes a 
great deal of soft power, could potentially greatly benefit from the use of drones in its 
militaries. As its leading countries are strong economically and technologically advanced, 
the use of drones can plays into its perceived current military weakness and can serve as a 
quick fix for national security and a greater stake in protection of its interests abroad. The 
intervention in Libya in 2011 would be a good example of this use. The difficulty comes 
in finding an acceptable use for the union as a whole when each country will inevitably 
be divided on a policy as their security interests vary greatly.131  
In the case of countries the U.S. is less inclined to work with, there are other 
economic and technological powers, including possibly China and Russia, whose markets 
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may cover that gap.132 Though much of this is still in the phase of speculation, it is 
reasonable to assume that the same technology being utilized against Al-Qaeda may one 
day be possessed by them. It may not be until that day comes that real legal change will 
be enacted to improve regulations and transparency, but at that point it may be too late133. 
Realizing the possibility that the tools of fighting terrorism can be turned around against 
the U.S. is vital in inciting urgency in assessing the current procedures in place for the 
operation of drones in targeted killing.  
The last idea to look at, the one pervading every argument about the fairness of 
targeted killing, is the idea that it is inherently unfair. Drone strikes have become the 
ultimate reinforcement of the disparity in power between states.134 The United States 
cannot be faulted for being the most technologically advanced country in the world when 
it comes to its military. At the same time, this great divide between the distributions of 
global power must be recognized as exacerbating anger against the faceless enemy the 
United States has become in so many regions of Yemen and Pakistan through its use of 
robots.135 Regardless of legal and even ethical arguments, in the scheme of globalization, 
drones can be seen as another example of a careless expansion of Western power without 
regard to the everyday lives of those living in countries that are less developed. The 
policy of enacting whatever is to the greatest benefit to the U.S. and the U.S. alone must 
be analyzed in order to fix so many of the root problems laying at the unrest and 
inequality currently consuming countries like Yemen and Pakistan.  
                                                        
132 Alec MacGillis, “Don’t Fear the Reaper: Here Comes the Drone Lobby,” The New Republic. Mar. 11, 
2013 
133 Michel Veuthey, in Interview with Author, October 31, 2013.  
134 Gabriella Blum and Phillip B. Heymann, “Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists: Lessons from the War on 
Terrorism.” (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010). 
135 Mark Bowden, “The Killing Machines,” The Atlantic. Aug. 2013. 
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Conclusion 
 There is a time and a place for drones, and for that reason, they are not going 
anywhere. Used within the correct legal context of war, with proportionality and 
discretion, it is possible to have a war focused on high-value targets alone, minimizing 
civilian casualties. Unfortunately, the U.S.’s use of drones in greater Pakistan and Yemen 
does not fall under this category. The high numbers, proportionally, of civilian casualties 
would suggest that the vague lines of the Obama Administration’s criteria for selection of 
targets have been crossed. This repeated action has created a toxic atmosphere in both 
Pakistan and Yemen where any further use of drones will prove to be counterproductive 
in the long-term, no matter the number of Taliban or Al-Qaeda operatives who are killed.  
 It is almost certain the United States is carrying out these attacks with the 
permission of both the Pakistani and Yemeni governments. This does not justify this 
policy. Instead, it avoids answering the question of the level of conflict in both countries 
as to whether they constitute conflict zones. It also avoids answering the level of direct 
danger that violence presents to the United States in determining their involvement in the 
first place. In answering these two difficult questions, it would appear that the time for 
U.S. military intervention against Al-Qaeda and its associates is nearly over, as the threat 
level may no longer be imminent. As military action becomes counterproductive, it is 
necessary to focus on tactics of local empowerment, law enforcement training, and the 
building of infrastructure to strengthen the societies of Pakistan and Yemen instead of 
working only to tear terrorist groups down.  
Living in a world where a Noble Peace Prize winning President keeps a list of 
operatives for remotely controlled aircraft to hunt and kill is unsettling. Even more 
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unsettling is having an enemy country turn around and have the same policy. In order to 
prevent this proliferation from happening in a dangerous cycle, accountability and 
transparency need to happen now. Even if this President and his administration prove 
trustworthy, there are many who will not. The time is now to put in place clear and 
publically articulated guidelines for the use of drones. It is time to publish the exact 
numbers of casualties of both combatants and civilians. Politics aside, it is essential to 
recognize those mistakes made in civilian casualties, provide reparations for their 
families, and endure necessary legal action that follows to make the world safer going 
forward. It may prove to be a process both painful and embarrassing for the United 
States, but given the alternatives, it is the only responsible course of action.  
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